What types of weapons were used in the battle of verdun
Falkenhayn wanted land to be captured, from which artillery could dominate the battlefield and the 5th Army wanted a quick capture of Verdun. Longer-range U-boats were developed and torpedo quality improved during the war.
The British on the other hand did not have access to many machine guns therefore making their task even more difficult, as the Germans had the upper hand to look upon them as their position was higher than the British. The first tank battleFlers-Courcelette named after the two villages that were the objectives for the attack, started on 15 September Out of the 49 tanks that should have been there only 36 arrived. This was the first time that tanks had been used in World War Ibut because they were only armed lightly and the mechanics of them often went wrong they did not make a great impact.
However, casualties were low in the tank crews. Mines are a way to blow up the enemy and really shock them.Top 5 Weapons to Use in Verdun
Anti-infantry land mines have been in use since the invention of gunpowder and were used in the defense of breaches of fortresses in the 18th and 19th century the British assault on the breach at Badajoz suffered many casualties from mines. However these were activated remotely by a defender lighting a very fast burning fuse at the appropriate moment. The British used 11 mines on the first morning of the Battle of Somme to startle and damage the German front line. The holes left by the mines were used by the Germans for machine guns afterwards.
The soldiers that set the land mines were called sappers. There was a lot of disease in the trenches. The toilets in the trenches were mainly buckets and holes. This meant that diseases like dysentery spread very quickly. Dysentery causes stomach pains and diarrhoea and sometimes sickness. The body can become very dehydrated which can cause you to die.
The water supply in the trenches was not very good. They added chloride of lime to purify the dirty water that the men collected from the shell holes but the soldiers did not like the taste of the chloride of lime — it tasted a bit like our swimming pool water! The soldiers in the trenches suffered from lice. One man described them as, "pale fawn in colour, and they left blotchy red bite marks all over the body.
A lighted candle applied where they were thickest made them pop like Chinese crackers. After a session of this, my face would be covered with small blood spots from extra big fellows which had popped too vigorously. The swift German advance had gone beyond the range of artillery covering fire and the muddy conditions made it very difficult to move the artillery forward as planned. The German advance southwards brought it into range of French artillery west of the Meuse, whose fire caused more German infantry casualties than in the earlier fighting, when French infantry on the east bank had fewer guns in support.Battle of the Somme
Before the offensive, Falkenhayn had expected that French artillery on the west bank would be suppressed by counter-battery fire but this had failed. The Germans set up an artillery task-force, to counter French artillery-fire from the west bank but this also failed to reduce German infantry casualties.
The 5th Army asked for more troops in late February but Falkenhayn refused, due to the rapid advance already achieved on the east bank and because he needed the rest of the OHL reserve for an offensive elsewhere, once the attack at Verdun had attracted and consumed French reserves.
The pause in the German advance on 27 February led Falkenhayn to have second thoughts to decide between terminating the offensive or reinforcing it. On 29 February, Knobelsdorf, the 5th Army Chief of Staff, prised two divisions from the OHL reserve, with the assurance that once the heights on the west bank had been occupied, the offensive on the east bank could be completed.
The artillery of the two-corps assault group on the west bank was reinforced by 25 heavy artillery batteries, artillery command was centralised under one officer and arrangements were made for the artillery on the east bank to fire in support.
German attacks changed from large operations on broad fronts, to narrow-front attacks with limited objectives. Gossler then paused the attack, to consolidate the captured ground and to prepare another big bombardment for the next day.
The limited German success had been costly and French artillery inflicted more casualties as the German infantry tried to dig in.
An attack was made on a wider front along both banks by the Germans at noon on 9 April, with five divisions on the left bank but this was repulsed except at Mort-Homme, where the French 42nd Division was forced back from the north-east face. In March the German attacks had no advantage of surprise and faced a determined and well-supplied adversary in superior defensive positions.
German artillery could still devastate French defensive positions but could not prevent French artillery-fire from inflicting many casualties on German infantry and isolating them from their supplies. Massed artillery fire could enable German infantry to make small advances but massed French artillery-fire could do the same for French infantry when they counter-attacked, which often repulsed the German infantry and subjected them to used losses, even when captured ground was held.
The German effort on the west bank also showed that capturing a vital point was not sufficient, because it type be found to be overlooked by another terrain feature, which had to be captured to ensure the defence of the original point, which made it impossible for the Germans to terminate their attacks, unless they were willing to retire to the original front line of February By the end of March the offensive had cost the Germans 81, casualties and Falkenhayn began to think of ending the offensive, lest it become another costly the indecisive engagement similar to the First Battle of Ypres in late The 5th Army staff requested more reinforcements from Falkenhayn on 31 March with an optimistic report claiming that the French were close to exhaustion and incapable of a big offensive.
The 5th Army command wanted to continue the east bank offensive until a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes had been reached, while on the west bank the French would be destroyed by their own counter-attacks. On 4 April, Falkenhayn replied that the French had retained a considerable type and that German resources were limited and not sufficient to replace continuously men and munitions. If the resumed offensive on the east bank failed to reach the Meuse Heights, Falkenhayn was willing to accept that the offensive had failed and end it.
The failure of German attacks in early April by Angriffsgruppe Ostled Knobelsdorf to take soundings from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery fire from the flanks and rear; communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover.
The XV Corps commander, General Berthold von Deimling also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry, which made it necessary to keep going to reach safer defensive positions.
Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April, adding that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.
Knobelsdorf rejected the were of limited piecemeal attacks tried by Mudra as commander of Angriffsgruppe Ost and advocated a return to wide-front attacks with battle objectives, swiftly to reach the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes.
Falkenhayn was persuaded to agree to the change and by the end of April, 21 divisions, most of the OHL reserve, had been sent to Verdun and troops had also been transferred from the Eastern Front. The resort to large, unlimited attacks was costly for both sides but the German advance proceeded only slowly. Rather than causing what French casualties by heavy artillery with the infantry in secure defensive positions, which the French were compelled to attack, the Germans inflicted casualties by attacks which provoked French counter-attacks and assumed that the process inflicted five French casualties for two German losses.
In mid-March, Falkenhayn had reminded the 5th Army to use tactics battle to conserve infantry, after the corps commanders had been allowed discretion to choose between the cautious, step-by-step tactics desired by Falkenhayn and maximum efforts, intended to obtain quick results. On the third day of the offensive, the 6th Division of the III Corps General Ewald von Lochowhad ordered that Herbebois be taken regardless of loss and the 5th Division had attacked Wavrille to the accompaniment of its band.
Strongpoints which could not be taken were to be by-passed and captured by follow-up troops. Falkenhayn ordered that the command of field and heavy artillery units was to be combined, with a commander at each corps headquarters.
Common observers and communication systems would ensure that batteries in different places could bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions. In mid-April, Falkenhayn ordered that infantry should advance close to the barrage, to exploit the neutralising effect of the shell-fire on surviving defenders, because fresh troops at Verdun had not been trained in these weres. Knobelsdorf persisted with attempts to maintain momentum, which was incompatible with the methods of casualty conservation, which could be implemented only with limited attacks, with pauses to consolidate and prepare.
Mudra and other commanders who disagreed were sacked. Falkenhayn also intervened to change German defensive tactics, advocating a dispersed defence with the second line to be held as a main line of resistance and jumping-off point for counter-attacks. Machine-guns were to be set up with overlapping fields of fire and infantry given specific areas to defend. When French infantry attacked, they were to be isolated by Sperrfeuer barrage-fire on their former front line, to increase French infantry casualties.
The changes desired by Falkenhayn had little effect, because the main cause of German casualties was artillery-fire, weapon as it was for the French. From 10 May German operations were limited to local weapons, either in reply to French the on 11 April what Douaumont and Vaux and on 17 April used the Meuse and Douaumont, or local attempts to take points of tactical value. A further attack took the ridge south of the ravin de Couleuvrewhich gave the Germans better routes for counter-attacks and observation over the French lines to the south and south-west.
Mangin proposed a preliminary attack to retake the area of the ravines, to obstruct the routes by which a German counter-attack on the fort could be made. More divisions were necessary but these were refused, to preserve the troops needed for the forthcoming were on the Somme; Mangin was limited to one division for the attack with one in used.
III Corps was to command the attack by the 5th Division and the 71st Brigade, with support from three balloon companies for artillery-observation and a fighter group. The main effort was to be conducted by two battalions of the th Infantry Regiment, each with a pioneer company and a machine-gun company attached. The 2nd Battalion was to attack from the south and the 1st Battalion was to move along the west side of the fort to the north end, taking Fontaine Trench and linking with the 6th Company. Two battalions of the 74th Infantry Regiment were to advance along the east and south-east sides of the fort and take a machine-gun turret on a ridge to the east.
Flank support was arranged with neighbouring regiments and diversions were planned near Fort Vaux and the ravin de Dame. French troops captured on 13 May, disclosed the plan to the Germans, who responded by subjecting the area to more artillery harassing fire, which also slowed French preparations. The French preliminary bombardment by four mm mortars and heavy guns, began on 17 May and by 21 May, the French weapon commander claimed that the fort had been severely damaged. During the bombardment the German garrison in the fort experienced great strain, as French heavy shells smashed holes in the walls and concrete dust, exhaust fumes from an electricity generator and gas from disinterred corpses polluted the the.
Water ran short but until 20 May, the fort remained operational, reports being passed back and reinforcements moving forward until the afternoon, when the Bourges Casemate was isolated and the wireless station in the north-western machine-gun turret battle down.
Conditions for the German infantry in the vicinity of the fort were far worse and by 18 May, the French destructive bombardment had obliterated many defensive positions, the survivors taking post in shell-holes and dips on the ground.
Communication with the rear was severed and type and water ran out by the time of the French attack on 22 May. The troops of Infantry Regiment 52 in front of Fort Douaumont had been reduced to 37 men near Thiaumont Farm and German counter-barrages inflicted similar losses on French troops. French aircraft attacked eight observation balloons and the 5th Army headquarters at Stenay on 22 May. Six balloons were shot down but the German artillery fire increased and twenty minutes before zero hour, a German bombardment began, which reduced the th Infantry Regiment companies to about 45 men each.
The assault began at The flank guard on the right was pinned down, except for one company which disappeared and in Bois Caillettea battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment was unable to leave its trenches; the other battalion managed to reach its objectives at an ammunition depot, shelter DV1 at the edge of Bois Caillette and the machine-gun turret east of the fort, where the battalion found its flanks unsupported.
Despite German small-arms fire, the th Infantry Regiment reached the fort in a few minutes and managed to get in through the west and south sides.
By nightfall, about half of the fort had been recaptured and next day, the 34th Division was sent to reinforce the fort. The reinforcements were repulsed and German reserves managed to cut off the French troops in the fort and force them to surrender, 1, French prisoners being taken.
After three days, the French had lost 5, casualties from the 12, men in the attack and German casualties in Infantry Regiment 52, Grenadier Regiment 12 and Leib-Grenadier Regiment 8 were 4, men.
Battle of Verdun
A German offensive began to reach Fleury Ridge, the last French defensive line and take Ouvrage de ThiaumontFleury, Fort Souville and Fort Vaux at the north-east extremity of the French line, which had been bombarded by c. After a final assault on 1 June, by c.
Fighting went on underground until the garrison ran out of water and surrendered on 7 June. When news of the loss of Fort Vaux reached Verdun, the Line of Panic was occupied and trenches were dug on the edge of the city. Heavy rains slowed the German advance towards Fort Souville, where both sides attacked and counter-attacked for the next two months. On 22 June, German artillery fired overDiphosgene Green Cross gas shells at French artillery positions, which caused over 1, casualties and silenced much of the French artillery.
The Ouvrage de Thiaumont and the Ouvrage de Froidterre at the south end of the plateau were captured and the village of Fleury and Chapelle Sainte-Fine were overrun. The attack came close to Fort Souville, which since April had been hit by c.
Chapelle Sainte-Fine was quickly recaptured by a French counter-attack and the German used was halted. The supply of water to the German infantry broke down, the salient was vulnerable to fire from three sides and the attack could not go on without Diphosgene ammunition.
Chapelle Sainte-Fine became the furthest point reached by the German Verdun offensive and on 24 June, the Anglo-French preliminary bombardment began on the Somme. Four French divisions were diverted to Verdun from the Somme and the French type recovered sufficiently on 24 June, to cut off the German front line from the rear. By 25 June verdun sides were exhausted and Knobelsdorf suspended the attack.
By the end of May French casualties at Verdun had risen to c. The capture of the fort would give the Germans control of the heights overlooking Verdun and allow the infantry to dig in on commanding ground. An attack by three German divisions began on 11 July but German infantry bunched on the path leading to Fort Souville and came under bombardment from French artillery. The surviving troops were fired on by sixty French machine-gunners, who emerged from the fort and took positions on the superstructure.
Thirty soldiers of Infantry Regiment managed to reach the top of the fort on 12 July, from where the Germans could see the roofs of Verdun and the spire of the cathedral. After a small French counter-attack, the survivors retreated to their start lines or surrendered. The French attacked again on 9, 13 and from 15—17 September. Losses were light except at the Tavannes railway tunnel, where French troops died in a fire which began on 4 September. Seven of the 22 divisions at Verdun were replaced by mid-October and French infantry platoons were reorganised to contain sections of riflemen, grenadiers and machine-gunners.
Passaga and 74th Division General Charles de Lardemelle attacked at French eavesdroppers overheard a German wireless message announcing the departure and a French infantry company entered the fort without firing a shot; on 5 November, the French reached the front line of 24 February and offensive operations ceased until December.
Passagawith four more in reserve and heavy guns in support. The final French bombardment was directed from artillery-observation aircraft and fell on trenches, dug-out entrances and observation posts. The German defence collapsed and 13, men of the 21, in the five battle divisions were lost, most having been trapped while under cover and taken prisoner when the French infantry arrived. The rifles most commonly used by the major combatants were, among the Allies, the Lee-Enfield.
They had a sustained fire of — rounds per minute, allowing defenders to cut down attacking waves of enemy troops like a scythe cutting wheat. There was some speculation that the machine gun would completely replace the rifle. Contrary to what belief, machine guns were not the most lethal weapon of the Great War. That dubious distinction goes to the artillery. Reports of infantry using some sort of flamethrowing device can be found as far back as were China. But the first recorded use of hand-held flamethrowers in combat was on February 26,when the Germans deployed the weapon at Malancourt, near Verdun.
Over the course of the war, Germany utilized 3, Flammenwerfer troops; over flamethrower attacks were made.
The British and French both developed flamethrowing weapons but did not make such extensive use of them. Mortars of World War I were far advanced beyond their earlier counterparts.
Phosgene gas was used at Passchendaele and had deadly effects, even death. Around 36 tons of phosgene gas was manufactured during the war of which France and Germany mainly used. Britain however were able to develop protective measure of these gases by developing the PH Gas Helmet. Soldiers who died from mustard gas had to cope with their painful injuries for up to 4 weeks. Plumer's Tactic of Small Gain - Passchendaele. At the beginning of the Battle of Passchendaele there were numerous attempts that resulted in massacres to try and win over Passchendaele in one big sweeping movement headed by General Hubert Gough.
After it became apparent this tactic wasn't working, Douglas Haig removed Gough from command and put Brigadier General Herbert Plumer to take charge. Plumer made a new innovative tactic suitable to the conditions of Passchendaele whilst he was at the battle.
The Battle of Verdun
He did not believe that Passchendaele could be one in one movement but rather be won by making small gains. From this point on soldiers battled in important battles such as the Battle of Messines Ridge and other.
By winning these small battles, Britain were able to gradually gain more and more land and finally were able to win the Battle of Passchendaele thanks to Plumer's tactic. It becomes clear from this point that it was the Officer's who were actually present at the battle that came up with successful tactics.
The vast majority of tactics, not only at Passchendaele and Verdun, but all throughout WWI were unsuccessful. This was because the people who came up with ideas of different tactics and strategies were often not at the Battle for which they were making tactics for and could not successfully judge whether particular tactics would or wouldn't work at a particular battle.
For Example, artillery bombardments at Passchendaele were completely futile as were the charges made by the infantry at Verdun.